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Responding to Ebola in DRC: when will we learn the lessons from 
Sierra Leone? 
Ebola Gbalo research team:  
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and Njala University, Sierra Leone 
Latest reports from the WHO suggest that the Ebola outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is serious and rapidly escalating. As of May 13th 2019, there were 
1,800 confirmed cases, 1,218 of whom had died, making it the second largest outbreak (so far) in history 
with a case fatality rate of 66% - much higher than previous outbreaks [1]. Jeremy Farrar, the head of the 
Wellcome Trust has called the situation “terrifying” [2]. Although Ring Vaccination is helping endeavours 
to contain transmission, it requires a sufficient coverage of contact persons and efficacy has been 
demonstrated only beyond 10 days after vaccination [3]. All critical response interventions (case and 
contact detection, community education, treatment and vaccines) are being severely impeded by the 
exceptionally difficult setting of armed violence: there are many active militia groups in North Kivu and 
Ituri Provinces in DRC [4], and the political instability and violence make it difficult to establish secure 
bases. The problem is complicated by high degrees of local distrust in the work of Ebola responders. The 
recent armed attacks on Ebola Treatment Centres in Butembo and Katwa and the killing of a WHO 
epidemiologist highlight the gravity of the situation [5]. Jeremy Farrar, of the Wellcome Trust has called 
for a six-nine month ceasefire to allow treatment teams into communities and Dr Tedros, Director-General 
of the World Health Organisation, has called for international donors to urgently commit to filling the 
funding gap to support these efforts [2]. These steps are important, but they address only part of the 
problem. There are numerous armed militia groups in the region and it is far from clear how much support 
they have, or how they relate to other kinds of authority within the region. To work in these spaces is 
exceptionally difficult and few people have the local knowledge, language skills, experience and networks 
to do so effectively.  The situation is complicated by widespread distrust of “outsiders” and of western-
led emergency-response systems as well as manipulation of these fears by those seeking to consolidate 
political or military power. Violence against local and international health workers is an expression of this 
distrust. But what can be done about it? 
Distrust and misunderstanding were also features of the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone (2014-15) and 
subsequent research has shown very clearly the need to work closely with frontline health responders 
and other authorities perceived locally to be legitimate, yet these lessons appear not to have been put 
into practice in DRC. Responders from the field, including Alima and Médecins Sans Frontières, recognise 
this more than most. On 10th May one of MSF’s field coordinators, Karin Huster, called for a rethink on 
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the Ebola response in DRC, by lowering its “emergency” profile to reduce suspicion and distrust in the 
isolation procedures that “scream Ebola” [6]. Kate White, another MSF emergency manager calls for 
closer work with communities where most of the deaths are happening. David Miliband, head of the 
International Rescue Committee, has also called for a “rethink” on the DRC response [2].  Augustin Augier, 
CEO of Alima, articulates a possible rethink observing that “the best way to overcome this distrust is to 
trust the community […] if we trust them and give them the means, we can do it." [7].  Yet among too 
many international response agencies this rethink is slow in coming. A policy panel discussion in Geneva 
on 13th May suggests the continued focus is on international responders and WHO’s coordination efforts 
[8]. Many of these efforts regard communities as recipients and supporters rather than owners of the 
response. The effort is to do more of the same rather than a commitment to finding completely new ways 
to work with communities, involving them directly in decision making. On the Geneva panel were 
researchers from the Ebola-Gbalo (“Ebola Troubles”) research project who discussed their recent analysis 
of responses to the Ebola outbreak in southern Sierra Leone. They underlined the critical importance of 
learning from local frontline responders and working closely with and through communities (chiefs, 
herbalists, youth leaders, traditional health attendants, community health workers, teachers and others) 
to promote locally acceptable treatment and burial practices, including offering “as-safe-as-possible” 
options for home-care where access to care centres is impossible. The multi-disciplinary Ebola-Gbalo 
study reconstructs the history of the epidemic and the work of responders in Bo and Moyamba districts 
who were working successfully before national or international responders came to support them. For 
example, Bo district fundraised locally and created their own surveillance protocols based on relationships 
with the communities. Much can be learned from this for North Kivu and Ituri Provinces where it seems 
likely that it will be local responders, not the international community, who play the critical role in turning 
the epidemic around in an exceptionally difficult setting in which community isolation is increased by 
activities of insurgent groups. We summarise the lessons of the Ebola-Gbalo study here and lessons 
already learnt from DRC. 
Establishing trust 
In Sierra Leone, our data show that community-level distrust was related to the nature of the response, 
and the distance to the locus of operational decision making. Large and distant Ebola Treatment Centres 
were distrusted because families could not follow patients and monitor their progress – rather patients 
were seen to be taken away, by hazmat-suited strangers, to die in unknown locations (many bodies were 
never returned, their graves unknown). Village-based Community Care Centres were preferred as triage 
facilities because community members knew the staff and could literally see inside [9]. Burial teams and 
contact tracing worked best when the recruits were local. Panic and confusion were alleviated when home 
carers were given clear instructions about how to care for their loved ones safely while waiting for help 
to arrive [10]. Where local agents, including health personnel, government agents and families, were 
strongly involved in planning and implementing the response it was more effective. Families were 
recognized as essential to the survival of their loved ones, and local health personnel felt fully valued. Our 
findings suggest that in Bo and Moyamba districts the response succeeded when community and district 
leaders were fully engaged. The actors differed in each district; international responders need to work 
with district and traditional authorities, as well as health workers embedded in communities to discover 
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other local leaders and figures of influence including women‘s groups, secret societies and religious 
groups, traditional healers, citizen welfare groups, youth organisations and so on.  
From the outset, international and national responders in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces in DRC have 
recognized the importance of working with people who are perceived to be legitimate figures of authority, 
even if they do not have legislative or official authority. Considerable effort has also been given to working 
with researchers (social scientists, including anthropologists and health systems researchers) with 
extensive knowledge of the region to map out different kinds of public authority [11]. Recording how 
these different authorities relate to each other, enabled responders to identify, and establish, effective 
working relationships with, for example, particular youth groups and militia groups in parts of North Kivu 
and Ituri Provinces. However, critical gaps in the response remain. There still appears to be lack of 
ownership of the response in some communities.   
Understanding reasons for this lack of ownership is crucial. In Sierra Leone, the earliest affected 
communities had no options but to engage with the disease. Our data illustrate how active local 
involvement promoted understanding. By whatever means, the sick had to be quarantined and the dead 
buried, even though the risks associated with these activities were known. Steps were then taken to 
improvise protective clothing and implement prevention measures. Carers and burial teams began to use 
plastic bags and coats worn backwards. Chiefs formulated Ebola by-laws, to restrict movement, and fine 
those not reporting cases of sickness. Volunteer youth groups mobilised to block roads, trace contacts, 
and safely bury the dead.   
In North Kivu, by contrast, the prompt arrival of international help may (perversely) have served to close 
down the available space for local agency.  It is perhaps telling that much of the response (and training of 
locals) is conducted in French – a language not understood by many villagers [12].  Instead, a counter-
discourse of Ebola denial has taken root in homes and villages, feeding attacks on Ebola facilities and staff.  
MSF’s General Director noted: “what we know is that organisations involved in the Ebola response – MSF 
included – have failed to gain the trust of a significant part of the population.” [13] Perhaps what is now 
needed is for the international response to step back and debate with communities and local responders 
about what they could do for themselves.  In Sierra Leone, where jobs for young people are scarce, paying 
“volunteers” a modest stipend proved an effective way of gaining community engagement.  
Learning from local frontline health staff and others attempting to care for the sick 
Local learning in Sierra Leone was rapid among health workers and villagers alike [14]. In the absence of 
a functioning, well-resourced health system, people drew on their own empirical observations about how 
Ebola was transmitted as well as any previous experiences they had had responding to cholera and 
smallpox. Our interviews report how infected health workers in Kenema (the site of an isolation facility to 
which many early Ebola cases were sent) phoned their colleagues in neighbouring Bo District (and 
elsewhere) to tell them they were seeing different symptoms from the ones being cited nationally, 
enabling staff to be prepared. This information was acted on by Bo district authorities and there are 
examples of prepared staff being able to stop infection spread as a result. In some instances, villagers 
adapted past knowledge to deal with the virus, including in some remote areas local efforts to quarantine 
affected houses and villages, rehydrate sick relatives and make impromptu PPE to safely bury their dead. 
A feature of the response in Sierra Leone, however, was the lack of attention given by national and 
international responders to the learning of these frontline and district-based responders. Had there been 
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a different mindset in action then guidelines and information on local Ebola symptoms, dignified burials, 
home-care and acceptable siting of treatment centres would have been corrected and agreed much 
earlier. 
By all accounts, the Ebola control on north-eastern Congo poses even more daunting challenges than in 
Sierra Leone, where war and outbreaks came separately and not conjoined. The region has been affected 
by protracted insecurity and conflict for decades, biomedical health care facilities vary widely in terms of 
capacity and adequacy of care, mortality and morbidity from other infectious diseases are rife, including 
on-going outbreaks of polio, cholera and yellow fever. Surviving in such circumstances requires skill and 
tenacity, a capacity to learn from the past and to draw on local knowledge. Communities (however 
defined) are learning rapidly, and so are responders, with safe burials, for example, being adapted to 
accommodate local practices [15]. Placing greater trust in communities to identify effective solutions is 
likely to pay dividends [16, 17]. Ebola in Sierra Leone taught international responders never to 
underestimate the levels of skill, common sense and adaptive ingenuity of local agents (from health 
workers and district managers to family members) to respond to Ebola once they understood the nature 
of the challenge, provided there was a real attempt to build working alliances between local and 
international partners based on mutual respect. Far greater efforts are now needed in DRC to engage with 
community members, local governance structures and district health authorities, and see them not only 
as implementers of an international emergency response, but involve them equally in decision making 
about how to roll-out vaccination and treatment. This will need to include home care and the 
establishment of locally staffed and managed burial teams, as well as a complete change of mind-set from 
international agencies. 
Supporting homecare  
Home care in managing Ebola is controversial.  For many, the risks of infection are too high, especially 
where supplies and support for the families is inconsistent. Another perspective is that in some 
circumstances it is unavoidable.  Our data show that families often had to wait long periods for help, and 
beds in Ebola treatment centres were not always available.  In these circumstances, families refused to 
abandon their loved ones, but coped as best they could often only with their own resources. Given the 
inadequate infrastructure and reach of the official response, there is always the issue of how care is to be 
given while waiting for help and in settings where no help is likely to arrive. In Sierra Leone, international 
NGOs and donors as well as government persistently overruled the suggestion to provide information and 
resources to enable people to care for loved ones within their homes [18].  
Yet, Ebola is fundamentally a “family disease”. In contexts of profound distrust, it is an illusion to expect 
mothers to willingly allow their children – or any family member – to be taken by health personnel in 
hazmat suits to barricaded emergency-response medical facilities regarded as places from which no-one 
returns alive. It is no surprise that most deaths in DRC have been in family homes, not in treatment 
centres. In Sierra Leone it will never be known how many people might have been saved if boots, chlorine 
and rubber gloves had been freely and widely available in health centres, markets, and households, 
allowing families to take basic precautions in caring for their sick, but almost certainly these items would 
have had a positive impact. While improving local trust in health centres is essential since specialised care 
in local, trusted treatment centres improves survival chances, improving the safety of home care with 
good advice may be the only realistic option in the more inaccessible villages in North Kivu and Ituri 
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Provinces, particularly in places isolated by fighting or characterised by high levels of distrust in the formal 
health system. One possible way forward might be to pre-emptively mass-vaccinate people who are 
identified locally as likely carers, though identification of these potential carers could be challenging and 
needs to be driven locally.  The use of the CDC guidelines on home-care (developed in Sierra Leone) could 
be very effective with backup radio discussions. If necessary, home-care leaflets could be dropped by 
drone, along with gloves, boots and possibly even chlorine – as local need arises. 
Engaging the military and security forces to contain Ebola 
The Sierra Leonean armed forces played a major role in enforcing quarantine. In particular, they provided 
24-hour armed guard for 21 days in houses where a person had become infected with Ebola. The results 
were mixed across our fieldwork area, with some of our study participants saying it was necessary to 
enforce compliance in this way, and others finding enforced quarantine counterproductive. There were 
multiple examples of by-laws and quarantine being broken, suggesting that it may be better to engage 
with populations in such a way that they take responsibility for their own quarantine rather than relying 
on external military forces. External actors could support such an approach by helping to provide food 
and medical supplies for a range of ailments. In the uncertain and fragmented context of DRC it is highly 
unlikely that any general restriction of movement could be enforced while the military is a major actor, 
furthermore stepping-up military presence is likely to further exacerbate suspicions of political 
manipulation and could possibly increase violence. The priority for DRC should be to support endeavours 
to negotiate a peace-deal and broker a ceasefire to encourage all armed groups to unite in the Ebola 
response. These endeavours are made harder by the corruption associated with local “business” interests 
from the influx of money and goods for the response; corruption that must be tackled. 
 
Some conclusions 
Recognising differences between settings, we feel, nevertheless, that it is urgent that the lessons from 
Sierra Leone help to rethink the response to the significantly worsening outbreak in North-Eastern DRC. 
These are: 1) to work closely with the different forms of local authority, including recognizing 
heterogeneity and different capacities among those authorities, with a commitment to allowing local 
authorities to shape the response ; 2) to allow local frontline health workers to advise international 
responders on the best means to reach and encourage cooperation from affected communities; 3) to 
disperse resources and basic life-saving equipment (including gloves, boots and chlorine) to communities, 
particularly in remote locations beyond formal health systems; frontline health workers and distant 
village/community leaders should also be provided with communication tools to expand the surveillance 
area beyond those reached by formal health systems; and 4) to recognise that in the highly politicised 
context of the Ebola outbreak in DRC, securitisation of response is problematic and will require reflection. 
If international agencies are to provide effective support to local responders, then serious efforts need to 
be given to peace-negotiations and brokering a ceasefire or securing safe corridors for aid delivery. But 
even if this does not happen, the situation could be transformed if international agencies, including WHO, 
“let go” of their control and trust community responders to take the lead. While acknowledging the 
enormous courage, commitment and hard work shown by responders to date, we share these reflections 
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in the hope that new ways can urgently be found to support communities to tackle the devastating 
outbreak in northern DRC. 
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